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Are Workers Compensated for 
Accepting Vulnerable Jobs? 
Evidence from West Africa
Philippe Bocquier, Christophe J. Nordman, and 
Aude Vescovo
One of the main focuses of studies on labor markets in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
the institutional segmentation between formal and informal sectors (Maloney 
2004; see also chapter 6). Informal work is defi ned from the point of view 
of the fi rm, worker, or line of business, depending on the policy aim. Th e 
1993 System of National Accounts (SNA93)—a set of international standards 
designed to establish a framework for the production of statistics on national 
accounts—classifi es fi rms based on statistical or tax registration criteria and 
whether they keep written accounts. Th is distinction serves no purpose when 
it comes to capturing individuals’ working conditions, especially employment 
vulnerability. 
Th e concept of vulnerability refers to how diffi  cult it is for individuals to 
manage the risks or cope with the losses and costs associated with the occur-
rence of risky events or situations.1 Th e vulnerability of workers can be seen, 
for example, in contract insecurity (unstable remuneration and no written 
contract); adverse working conditions; and, more generally, a high level of 
exposure to job risks. Firm or business vulnerability criteria (industry, busi-
ness size, and institutional sector) are not used here, because they refl ect 
interfi rm rather than interindividual dualism. 
Vulnerable workers can be found in all formal and informal private fi rms; 
they work in public and semi-public corporations as well. Th is chapter focuses 
solely on the private sector (formal and informal businesses), based on the 
assumption that vulnerability is driven by diff erent mechanisms in the public 
and private sectors. 
Th e theory of compensating diff erentials—as formalized by Brown (1980), 
Rosen (1986), and Murphy and Topel (1987)—posits that workers may receive 
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pecuniary compensation commensurate with the danger or strenuousness of 
their tasks or the adverse nature of their working conditions.2 In developed 
countries, for instance, everything else equal, hazardous and highly strenuous 
jobs are oft en better paid than jobs without these attributes.3 Our interpretation 
of the link between vulnerability and income draws on developments in the 
theory of compensating diff erentials, which we apply to both working condi-
tions and employment vulnerability for the fi rst time in African countries. Our 
working assumption is that, other things equal, workers classifi ed as vulnerable 
earn more than more stable, steady workers classifi ed as less vulnerable. If this 
is the case, some individuals will be willing to hold vulnerable jobs, especially if 
the immediate need to earn income outweighs the medium- or long-run advan-
tage associated with stable jobs. 
Th e questions of what determines vulnerability and how vulnerability and 
remuneration are linked raise several methodological problems, which this 
chapter tries to solve. First, entry selection occurs in the labor market. Second, 
sample selection concerns the individual’s sector allocation (public, formal pri-
vate, or informal). Observable individual characteristics (such as human capital 
in general) as well as unobservable individual characteristics infl uence both 
the decision to participate in a particular labor market segment and the level 
of individual earnings in Africa. Th ird, vulnerability is likely to be endogenous 
in the earnings equations. It is endogenous if individuals’ unobservable char-
acteristics are correlated with both their level of vulnerability and their level 
of earnings. It is important to take these eff ects into account, because they can 
produce biases, such as overestimation of the impact of vulnerability on indi-
vidual earnings if, for example, unobservable characteristics such as low worker 
motivation or ability (or conversely, worker perseverance) are positively corre-
lated with the probability of obtaining a vulnerable job and negatively correlated 
with earnings.
Our analysis takes a distributional approach.4 It assumes that the worker’s 
relative position on the remuneration scale infl uences how vulnerability aff ects 
income. Whereas workers with vulnerable jobs at the low end of the pay scale 
receive less in compensation than workers with identical characteristics who do 
not hold vulnerable jobs, workers in vulnerable jobs at the high end of the pay 
scale are paid premiums. Th ese diff erent mechanisms could refl ect diff erences 
in bargaining power and labor market imbalances. Th eir greater bargaining 
would enable workers at the upper tail of the earnings distribution to secure 
higher pay for greater vulnerability. Conversely, workers at the bottom of the 
earnings distribution may be more forceful in negotiating for premium pay if 
they are seeking to secure a living wage. Compensation for vulnerability there-
fore would decrease the further the worker moves from a minimum subsistence 
income. In the case of labor market imbalances, employers’ capacity to provide 
fi nancial compensation for adverse working conditions may also depend on 
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the demand for and supply of labor. Where, for example, labor supply outstrips 
demand, employers do not need to compensate workers for adverse working 
conditions. 
All these hypotheses, which assume that the eff ect of vulnerability on earn-
ings diff ers depending on the position in the earnings distribution, are tested 
by quantile regressions.
Th e chapter is organized as follows. Th e fi rst section briefl y examines the 
theoretical arguments underlying the existence of compensating diff erentials 
and highlights the theory’s implications for the case study. Th e second section 
presents the data from the 1-2-3 surveys of the West African economic capitals 
and shows how key variables were constructed.5 Th e third section presents the 
econometric models. Th e fourth section discusses the results. Th e last section 
draws conclusions. 
The Theory of Compensating Differentials
Th ere is a long history of economic research into the forces that narrow or 
widen wage diff erentials between individuals. Th e fi rst models focused on com-
petitive markets. Th ey found wage premiums compensating nonpecuniary job 
attributes, such as working conditions, and diff erences in job stability across 
industries (Brown 1980; Rosen 1986; Murphy and Topel 1987). Most authors 
acknowledge that when job characteristics other than wages enter into the labor 
market decisions of fi rms and workers, market balance is achieved by the equal-
ization of workers’ utilities rather than their wages. 
Rosen (1986) posits that the reasoning behind compensating mechanisms is 
a simple supply-and-demand structure. Labor supply decisions have to balance 
the trade-off  between earned income (wages) and the cost of performing a job 
(stress, repetition, production deadlines, and so forth) such that, at the opti-
mum, wage diff erences correspond to the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and working conditions. Labor demand decisions by fi rms are 
based on a trade-off  between the need to provide compensation commensurate 
with the strenuous or hazardous nature of a task and the need to improve the 
working conditions off ered. 
Under the assumption of homogeneous individuals and heterogeneous work 
environments, wages across workers diff er such that all workers obtain the same 
utility. To encourage workers to accept worse working conditions, fi rms have to 
off er higher wages. Lift ing the assumption of homogeneous individuals neces-
sarily introduces a great deal of uncertainty as to the existence of compensation 
for working conditions when it is observed at the midpoint of the worker dis-
tribution. It could prove necessary to divide the population into more homo-
geneous groups—by, for example, using a conditional wage quantile derived 
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from quantile regressions, in order to reduce the noise created by the presence 
of individual heterogeneity in the estimation of the compensating diff erential.
Noncompetitive theories argue that wage deviations between apparently 
identical individuals tend to refl ect noncompensating diff erentials, such as 
workers’ relative bargaining power (Daniel and Sofer 1998; Manning 2003) and 
the existence of effi  ciency wages.6 Other hypotheses point to the existence of 
information asymmetries, which may increase friction in the match between 
the supply of and demand for labor (Hwang, Mortensen, and Reed 1998), and 
interfi rm diff erences in factor productivity (Burdett and Mortensen 1998; 
 Pissarides 2000; Mortensen 2003).
Th ere is a dearth of research on the link between compensating diff eren-
tials and observed job attributes, especially when it comes to distributional 
approaches.7 Fernández and Nordman (2009) show that the compensating 
diff erential probably depends on the worker’s relative position in the earnings 
distribution. For example, pecuniary compensation for adverse working condi-
tions could well be overestimated if the most capable (or resistant) workers are 
selected for employment where these attributes are more common. Moreover, 
given the assumption that the most capable individuals are also the most likely 
to receive effi  ciency wages, or to have a certain amount of bargaining power, 
working conditions could well have less to do with the wage-setting process for 
these individuals than for workers without these characteristics. More generally, 
workers could fi nd it easier to ask for premiums for adverse working conditions 
when the demand for labor exceeds the supply, creating a labor market imbal-
ance that probably varies along the earnings distribution.
Data and Deﬁ nition of Vulnerability
Th e data come from Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys conducted in the follow-
ing economic capitals in 2001/02: Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire), Bamako (Mali), 
Cotonou (Benin), Dakar (Senegal), Lomé (Togo), Niamey (Niger), and 
 Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) (for a description of the surveys, see box O.1 
in the overview). Th e sample was restricted to all working-age individuals as 
defi ned by International Labour Organization (ILO)—that is, people 15 and 
older. It was then reduced to include only people with at least fi ve years of 
potential labor market experience, in order to take account of workers’ employ-
ment histories and thereby understand the longitudinal aspects of vulnerability. 
Potential experience is defi ned as the individual’s age minus the number of years 
of education and the six years theoretically preceding the start of school. Th e 
fi ve-year potential experience span is broad enough to circumvent the problem 
of date measurement errors (end of education and end of previous job) and 
narrow enough to prevent the samples from being too small.
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Th e sample was reduced from 58,385 individuals 15 and older to 50,772 
individuals 15 and older with fi ve years or more of potential experience, from 
33,390 employed workers 15 and older to 32,314 employed workers 15 and 
older with fi ve years or more of potential experience. Among the employed 
workers, we are interested only in formal and informal private sector workers 
with some income. Informal work is defi ned from the point of view of the fi rm, 
worker, or line of business, depending on the policy aim. Th e 1993 System 
of National Accounts—a set of international standards designed to establish a 
framework for the production of statistics on national accounts—defi nes infor-
mality based on statistical or tax registration criteria and the keeping of written 
accounts.
Th e formal private sector regression samples include 302–950 workers 
(depending on the country), with a small minority of self-employed workers 
(table 4.1). Th e informal private sector regression samples range from 2,230 to 
3,492 workers, with a majority of self-employed workers. Individuals with no 
income are people with fi ve years of potential experience who are not working 
(as wage or self-employed workers). Unpaid (contributing) family workers are 
included among the self-employed, because they share profi ts with the lead-
ing independent worker in the family. Earnings for dependent workers include 
wages and benefi ts (bonuses, paid holidays, housing, benefi ts in kind, and so 
forth). Nonmonetary benefi ts are converted into wages. Profi ts of independent 
workers were reconstituted by recapping income and expenses (including inter-
mediary spending, employee’s wages, taxes, investment) over a reference period 
to which the respondent could relate. For both dependent and independent 
workers, monthly net income was estimated and divided by the number of 
hours worked per month to obtain hourly earnings.
Construction of the Vulnerability Variables
We used a number of individual employment status indicators, which we 
believe best capture the multifaceted nature of vulnerability in the main job. 
Business or production unit criteria (industry, business size, and institutional 
sector) were not used, because they refl ect interfi rm rather than interworker 
diff erences. 
Worker vulnerability is defi ned by nine dichotomous variables, correspond-
ing to diff erent aspects of vulnerability (table 4.2). Th e variables distinguish 
independent workers (employers and own-account workers) from dependent 
workers (employees, contributing family workers, and apprentices). 
Th e fi rst variable, contractual insecurity, concerns the informal nature of the 
contract. Th is variable equals 1 if the individual has no written contract or does 
not receive a payslip and 0 otherwise. (It is not defi ned for self-employed work-
ers, to whom it does not apply.) No distinction is made between workers with 
fi xed-term contracts and workers with open-ended contracts.
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Tab le 4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Study Sample in Seven Cities in West Africa 
Statistic Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Sample total 11,343 13,002 11,574 19,054 9,906 14,524 13,733
Working-age population 7,503 7,529 7,639 12,487 6,418 8,284 8,525
Working-age population with ﬁ ve or more years potential experience 6,537 6,561 6,517 11,014 6,546 7,269 7,328
 Working-age population with zero income 2,568 2,746 2,374 6,074 2,081 4,053 3,663
 Public sector (positive earnings) 302 457 398 498 306 577 584
 Regression samples
Formal private sector (positive earnings) 825 452 509 950 302 409 336
  Dependent 782 365 423 868 261 373 307
  Independent 43 87 86 82 41 36 29
Informal sector (positive earnings) 2,842 2,906 3,236 3,492 2,857 2,230 2,745
  Dependent 894 528 460 1,123 508 562 724
  Independent 1,948 2,378 2,776 2,369 2,349 1,668 2,021
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) conducted in 2001/02 by the Observatoire 
économique et statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne (AFRISTAT); Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation (DIAL); and national statistics institutes.
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Table 4.2 Distribution of Vulnerability Criteria by Sector and Job Status in Seven Cities 
in West Africa 
Criterion
Criterion/job status
Formal private 
sector
Informal 
sector
All private 
sector
Contractual insecurity (no contract or no payslip)
Independent n.a. n.a. n.a.
Dependent 0.49 0.97 0.76
All n.a. n.a. n.a.
Independent with no employees (wage-earning or otherwise)
Independent 0.11 0.68 0.66
Dependent n.a. n.a. n.a.
All n.a. n.a. n.a.
Adverse working conditions (premises not dedicated to the job)
Independent 0.17 0.60 0.59
Dependent 0.05 0.22 0.15
All 0.06 0.50 0.42
Casual labor (piece-rate, day, or seasonal work)
Independent 0.13 0.20 0.20
Dependent 0.10 0.15 0.13
All 0.10 0.19 0.17
Unstable remuneration (paid in form other than fixed wage or, for independent workers, profits)
Independent 0.06 0.05 0.05
Dependent 0.18 0.40 0.31
All 0.17 0.14 0.15
Time-related underemployment (works fewer hours than statutory working week and would like to work more)
Independent 0.09 0.13 0.13
Dependent 0.07 0.07 0.07
All 0.07 0.12 0.11
Working second vulnerable job outside public sector in place or premises not dedicated to the job, in firm with 
fewer than five people
Independent 0.00 0.02 0.02
Dependent 0.01 0.01 0.01
All 0.01 0.01 0.01
Employment instability (on downwardly mobile or unstable career path)
Independent 0.01 0.03 0.03
Dependent 0.08 0.08 0.08
All 0.07 0.04 0.05
Unwanted job (involuntary departure from previous job or job dissatisfaction)
Independent 0.05 0.06 0.06
Dependent 0.09 0.06 0.07
All 0.09 0.06 0.06
(continued next page)
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Th e second variable concerns independent workers only. It is equal to 1 if 
an independent worker has no employees, wage-earning or otherwise. Self-
employed professionals working alone in intellectual professions (computer 
engineers, doctors, notaries, lawyers) are not considered to be vulnerable.
Adverse working conditions are assessed in terms of the place or premises 
where the individual works. Th is variable is equal to 1 if the individual’s main 
job is itinerant, worked from a makeshift  or fi xed street post, at the customer’s 
home, or from the individual’s own home without having a dedicated set-up 
for the job. It is equal to 0 if the individual works from a vehicle, from home 
with a dedicated set-up for the job, in a public market, or on business premises 
(including fi elds, in the case of urban market gardening). Where jobs do not 
require premises even though they are not physically strenuous, the existence 
of premises, an offi  ce, or a surgery is taken as an indication of stability and 
nonadverse working conditions. Excluding all intellectual professions from 
vulnerability in terms of working conditions would be tantamount to defi ning 
a vulnerable worker profi le as consisting mainly of roving street vendors and 
servants. Doing so would be inconsistent with the analysis of the many forms 
of vulnerability and the link with earnings.
Casual labor is a source of vulnerability. According to Pagès (2003), vul-
nerability in employment covers both various forms of underemployment and 
the lack of socioeconomic security at work associated with institutional vari-
ables (employment contracts, compliance with labor code, and so forth) and 
their time-related factors (casual and unstable employment). Th us, even if a 
job is protected or off ers good conditions, the casual nature of employment 
means that this protection is not guaranteed over time and that the risk of vis-
ible underemployment is high. Th erefore, a casual job is deemed a criterion of 
vulnerability. Th e casual labor variable is equal to 1 if the individual works for 
a piece rate or as a day or seasonal worker. It is equal to 0 if the individual has 
a steady job.
Vulnerable (meets at least one of the vulnerability criteria)
Independent 0.42 0.87 0.86
Dependent 0.62 0.98 0.82
All 0.60 0.90 0.85
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 4.1 for details).
Note: The mean of the contractual insecurity variable for the subsample of formal private sector dependent 
workers who report strictly positive earnings is 0.49. This means that 49 percent of dependent workers in the 
formal private sector do not have a written contract or do not receive a payslip. n.a. = not applicable.
Table 4.2 (continued)
Criterion
Criterion/job status
Formal private 
sector
Informal 
sector
All private 
sector
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Th e unstable remuneration variable is equal to 1 if a dependent worker is not 
paid a fi xed wage or if an independent worker is not paid in the form of a fi xed 
wage or profi ts (by the day or hour, piece rate, commission, or in kind). Th is 
variable diff ers from the variable describing casual jobs. A worker in a steady 
job may be paid erratically (as is frequently the case). Such workers are assumed 
to be more vulnerable, because they cannot predict what their situation will be 
in the coming days or weeks.
Pagès (2003) defi nes vulnerability as underemployment or the probability 
of becoming underemployed. Time-related underemployment corresponds to 
the situation in which individuals work less than the statutory working week 
when they would like to work more. Time-related underemployment is similar 
to structural unemployment (see chapters 1 and 2). Th e underemployment vari-
able is equal to 1 if the individual works less than 35 hours and would like to 
work more. It is equal to 0 otherwise.
Working a second job could, in certain cases, refl ect underemployment or 
instability in the main job. Time-related or invisibly underemployed individuals 
or piece-rate workers may hold second jobs to keep money coming in when they 
are temporarily laid off  from their main job.8 Working a second job may be a way 
of reducing or spreading the risks of an income loss or decrease. Th e second job 
variable is equal to 1 if the individual works a vulnerable second job—that is, a 
job outside the public sector, in a place or premises not dedicated to this job and 
in a fi rm of less than fi ve people—and if the number of cumulative hours worked 
in the two jobs is 70 hours or more a week. It is equal to 0 otherwise.
Pagès (2005) emphasizes the importance of considering the dynamic aspect 
of vulnerability. Th e above employment situations aff ect workers’ capacities and 
behavior (the skills-employment causality is reversed). We defi ne two dynamic 
vulnerability criteria. Instability in employment is defi ned by a change of job in 
the last fi ve years without an improvement or with a drop in status.9 Th is vari-
able is equal to 0 if the individual is in his or her fi rst job or found a job following 
a period of unemployment or inactivity over the last fi ve years. It is also equal 
to 0 if the individual has been in the same job for fi ve years or the individual 
upgraded his or her job status (from the point of view of socioeconomic group, 
refl ecting upward professional mobility) in the last fi ve years. It is equal to 1 
when the individual changed job in the last fi ve years without an improvement 
in status. In the case of a transition from independent to dependent worker 
(or vice versa), the reason for the change of job (voluntary or involuntary) is 
used to determine whether or not the transition represents an upwardly mobile 
professional move.
An unwanted job is defi ned as a job with which the worker is dissatisfi ed 
and that he or she accepted following an involuntary departure from the previ-
ous job. Job dissatisfaction is measured by the answer to a question about the 
individual’s aspirations (keep or change job and, if the respondent indicates the 
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desire to change, for what type of job; see chapter 3). An unwanted job is more 
likely to be worked because of constraints and is hence mismatched with the 
worker’s expertise, skills, and preferences. Workers may be dissatisfi ed because 
they are overqualifi ed for their job, because working conditions are physically 
strenuous, because the hours are unsuitable, or for other reasons. Working an 
unwanted job may indicate that a worker has taken a “stopgap job” in the hope 
of immediate gains. 
Other potential vulnerability criteria were not taken into account. For 
example, we do not create a social security variable, because our income vari-
able includes all welfare benefi ts. Unstable remuneration or lack of a written 
contract, for example, should be enough to refl ect social insecurity. Mem-
bership in a union and access to in-house training are variables of interest. 
However, these phenomena are so rare in the cities studied that we deemed 
them negligible.
For each employment status (dependent or independent), we defi ne the inten-
sity of vulnerability as the sum of the eight previously defi ned criteria applicable 
to this status. Maximum vulnerability intensity ranges from 4 to 7 depending on 
the city and sector. No city posts the maximum score of 8 (table 4.3).
A dichotomous dummy variable for vulnerability, built by setting a vul-
nerability threshold (a minimum number of vulnerability criteria to be met 
to be deemed vulnerable) would have simplifi ed our measurement. However, 
the eff ect of vulnerability on earnings might be nonlinear, which would not be 
revealed by a dichotomous dummy variable. Th e fact that a worker meets one or 
two vulnerability criteria may refl ect constraints imposed by the labor market. 
However, workers may choose to accept more vulnerable working conditions 
if doing so yields higher earnings.
Descriptive Statistics
Contractual insecurity aff ects 97 percent of dependent workers in the infor-
mal sector (see table 4.2). Surprisingly, it also aff ects half of employees in the 
formal private sector, 49 percent of whom do not have written contracts or 
receive payslips. Similarly, 18 percent of dependent workers in the formal pri-
vate sector and 40 percent of dependent workers in the informal sector do not 
receive a fi xed wage. Th ese fi gures suggest that the distinction between formal 
private fi rms and informal fi rms is not suffi  cient for analyzing workers’ living 
and working conditions: worker vulnerability needs to be examined in all insti-
tutional sectors.
Th e main sources of vulnerability among independent workers in the infor-
mal sector are adverse working conditions (faced by 60 percent of independent 
workers), including the lack of dedicated premises or workplace, and own-
account employment (that is, not having any employees, 68 percent of indepen-
dent workers). Th ese percentages are small in the formal private sector, where 
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Table 4.3 Intensity of Job Vulnerability in Seven Cities in West Africa 
Sector/
intensity
(0–8)
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Number 
of 
workers Percent
Number 
of 
workers Percent
Number 
of 
workers Percent
Number 
of 
workers Percent
Number 
of 
workers Percent
Number 
of 
workers Percent
Number 
of 
workers Percent
Formal private sector
0 321 38.9 185 40.9 194 38.1 424 44.6 90 29.8 136 33.3 129 38.4
1 280 33.9 175 38.7 199 39.1 243 25.6 116 38.4 112 27.4 110 32.7
2 145 17.6 68 15.0 69 13.6 160 16.8 58 19.2 87 21.3 55 16.4
3 42 5.1 19 4.2 35 6.9 88 9.3 27 8.9 46 11.3 26 7.7
4 28 3.4 5 1.1 11 2.2 29 3.1 7 2.3 23 5.6 16 4.8
5 8 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 0.6 3 1.0 4 1.0 0 0.0
6 1 0.1 0 0.0 1 0.2 0 0.0 1 0.3 1 0.2 0 0.0
7 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 825 100 452 100 509 100 950 100 302 100 409 100 336 100
Informal sector
0 347 12.2 263 9.1 306 9.5 286 8.2 267 9.4 126 5.7 329 12.0
1 995 35.0 933 32.1 1,029 31.8 1,077 30.8 738 25.8 502 22.5 848 30.9
2 972 34.2 1,035 35.6 1,241 38.4 1,102 31.6 1,052 36.8 761 34.1 907 33.0
3 372 13.1 495 17.0 488 15.1 644 18.4 508 17.8 502 22.5 450 16.4
4 124 4.4 154 5.3 151 4.7 300 8.6 235 8.2 263 11.8 166 6.1
5 23 0.8 25 0.9 19 0.6 72 2.1 49 1.7 68 3.1 40 1.5
6 8 0.3 1 0.0 2 0.1 10 0.3 8 0.3 8 0.4 5 0.2
7 1 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 2,842 100 2,906 100 3,236 100 3,492 100 2,857 100 2,230 100 2,745 100
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 4.1 for details).
Note: The lines cutting across the distributions represent the average vulnerability intensity position. For example, in the formal private sector in Niamey, average vulnerability is 1.3, so a line is 
drawn between 1 and 2. 
146  URBAN LABOR MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
self-employed workers represent less than 20 percent of workers in all cities 
studied. Working conditions for independent and dependent workers in the 
informal sector are very similar. Most independent workers are self-employed 
street vendors; others are tailors, hairdressers, repairers, mechanics, masons, 
carpenters, and metalworkers. Similarity in working conditions justifi es ana-
lyzing all informal workers in one category, controlling for their dependency 
status as a covariate.
Some 17 percent of dependent private sector workers and 14 percent of 
independent private sector workers are not vulnerable (do not meet any vul-
nerability criteria). Th ese rates mask huge diff erences between the formal and 
informal sectors. In the informal sector, just 2 percent of dependent workers 
and 12 percent of independent workers are not vulnerable. In all, 85 percent of 
the private sector workers in the cities studied meet at least one vulnerability 
criterion.
Testing the Existence of Compensating Mechanisms 
for Vulnerability
In a fi rst step, the determinants of vulnerability are analyzed using a simple 
linear model whose dependent variable is the intensity of vulnerability. Th e 
explanatory variables introduced are dummy variables for the individual’s status 
in the household (1 if household head) and the institutional sector of the indi-
vidual’s father when the individual was 15 years old (public, formal private, or 
informal private). Th ese fi rst variables are denoted Z. Th e set of control variables 
included in all the estimated equations (X) covers gender; education (number 
of years of completed education) and its square; potential experience and its 
square; religion; migrant status (rural, urban, or foreign migrant); marital sta-
tus; seniority in the fi rm or main job and its square; and independent versus 
dependent worker status.
To test the existence of compensating earnings diff erentials for vulnerability, 
we estimate the log of the hourly earnings rate for the main job for each city. 
Included in this earnings rate are benefi ts such as year-end bonuses, profi t-
sharing, paid leave, medical benefi ts, social security, bonuses, and benefi ts in 
kind, such as housing, electricity, and transport. Earnings are calculated based 
on the monthly earnings for the reference month and the number of hours 
worked per week.
Approach at the Mean
An approach at the mean studies the impact of vulnerability intensity on 
average earnings. In this approach, what counts is the cumulative number of 
vulnerability criteria met by an individual. 
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Let h be an indicator of four institutional sector categories (h = 1: zero earn-
ings, h = 2: public sector, h = 3: formal private sector, and h = 4: informal sector). 
Our purpose is to estimate the eff ect jh = (j1h,j2h) of vulnerability index I on 
earnings in the formal and informal private sectors using
Yh = bhX + j1hI + j 2hI2 + eh ∀h = 3,4. (4.1)
Introduction of a second-degree vulnerability intensity polynomial I2 is designed 
to take into account any nonlinearity in the eff ect of vulnerability on earnings. 
Yh is observed only if the individual has a paid job and chooses sector h. 
Given that the labor markets in developing countries are segmented, sector 
entry selection may exist in addition to labor market entry selection (see chap-
ters 5 and 6). A selection model is therefore needed. We use Lee (1983), an 
extension of Heckman’s method, to estimate the earnings equation with multi-
nomial selection. Th is method corrects the selection bias, by estimating
Yh = bhX + j1hI + j 2hI2 + lh + kh ∀h = 3,4 (4.2)
where lh, a generalization of the inverse Mills ratio in Heckman’s method, cor-
rects the selection bias generated by the fact that belonging to sector h rather 
than sector k (k ≠ h) may refl ect the action of unobservable variables also asso-
ciated with income. Th e selection eff ect is interpreted as the diff erence between 
the earnings of a fi rst individual in sector h and the income that would have 
been earned by a second individual—drawn randomly from the fi rst equation 
sample (that is, an individual from any sector) and with the same observable 
characteristics as the fi rst individual—had he or she belonged to sector h.
Th e identifying variables (M) required for the robustness of the selection 
model are the inverse of the dependency ratio (the ratio of the number of 
employed workers to household size); a dummy variable for whether the indi-
vidual’s father went to primary school; and a dummy variable for whether the 
individual’s head of household is a woman. Th ese variables are introduced into 
the selection equation (multinomial logit model with four categories for h: 1,…, 
4), but not into the earnings equation. Th e assumption is that these variables 
infl uence earnings only through sector allocation.10 
A second problem that needs to be addressed is the potential endogeneity of 
the intensity of vulnerability. Unobservable characteristics may aff ect both the 
explanatory variable for vulnerability and the level of earnings. Th is would be 
the case, for example, if “poor” workers were selected for employment statuses 
in which vulnerability is greatest. In this case, any positive eff ect vulnerability 
might have on earnings could be underestimated. As disregarding this factor 
could produce nonconvergent estimators of jh = (j1h,j 2h), the vulnerability 
intensity indicator needs to be instrumented.
To do so, we use the control function method rather than the two-stage 
least squares estimator (Garen 1984; Wooldridge 2005). Where earnings are 
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nonlinear in the potentially endogenous variable (here vulnerability inten-
sity), this method provides more accurate estimators than the two-stage least 
squares method (Card 2001). Th e control function method involves regress-
ing the intensity of vulnerability on the individual characteristics X and the 
instrumental variables Z, not correlated with k, the residual from the earnings 
equation (equation 4.2) and (partially) correlated with I (equation 4.3). Th ese 
instruments are the dummy variables for the status of the head of household 
and the dummy variables for the institutional sector of the individual’s father 
when the individual was 15. In principle, these variables do not have a direct 
impact on earned income, because they have nothing to do with productivity, 
the worker’s capacities, or the type of job held. Being a head of household could 
create an incentive to accept a more vulnerable job when faced with urgent 
family needs, but it is more likely that household heads would search for a less 
vulnerable job to guarantee household income stability. All things equal, heads 
of household may adopt long-term strategies and be less drawn by immediate 
gains at the cost of a vulnerable job. 
Another exogenous source of variation in job search can be obtained with 
the father’s occupation when the worker was 15. Th e father’s occupation is likely 
to infl uence the child’s aversion, attraction, or resistance to job vulnerability. Let 
the vulnerability index I be regressed on X and Z such that 
I = ahX + g hZ + mh ∀h = 3,4. (4.3)
Th e estimated residual from this fi rst linear regression, mˆ, is introduced as an 
explanatory variable, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, into the earn-
ings equation:
Yh = b hX + j1hI + j 2hI2 + lh + mˆh + kh ∀h = 3,4. (4.4) 
Th e resulting estimators of jh = (j1h,j2h) are convergent if the model satisfi es 
the classic identifi cation conditions and the instruments are independent of mˆ 
and not correlated with the earnings equation residual kh.
For all estimations, the bootstrap method (500 replications) was used to esti-
mate the standard deviations, which are biased by the nature of the two-stage 
estimations.
Distributional Approach
Th e impact of vulnerability on earnings may diff er across the earnings distribu-
tion. Quantile regressions are used to take these potential eff ects into account. 
First, equation (4.1) is reestimated using conditional quantiles, such that
qt (Yh⏐X,I,I2) = b h(t)X + j1h(t)I + j 2h(t)I2 ∀h = 3,4 (4.5)
where qt (Yh⏐X,I,I2) is the t th conditional quantile of Yh, and vector bh(t) and 
the estimated coeffi  cients j1h(t) and j2h(t) provide the eff ects of the diff erent 
regressors at the th quantile of the earnings distribution in sector h. 
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Th is framework does not take selection eff ects into account. Whereas the 
control function method can also be used in the case of quantile regression, 
to our knowledge no models exist that can estimate quantile regressions with 
multinomial selection. Moreover, this distributional approach corrects only the 
supposed endogeneity of vulnerability. Our approach is not a major drawback, 
because, as shown below, the results of the quantitative approach are not sensi-
tive to the consideration of a possible selection eff ect.
Results
Approach at the Mean
Table 4.4, based on models (4.1), (4.2), and (4.4), shows the marginal eff ects of 
the vulnerability indicator on earnings, calculated at the average vulnerability 
point.11 Whether or not the sample selection and endogeneity of vulnerability 
are corrected, the marginal eff ect of average vulnerability is negative in both 
sectors for all cities except the informal sector in Dakar, where this eff ect is 
slightly positive. In both the formal private and informal sectors, the selection 
correction barely alters the results. However, the correction for the endogeneity 
Table 4.4 Marginal Effects of Vulnerability Intensity on Earnings in Seven Cities in West Africa 
(percent)
Sector Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Formal private sector
No selection correction, 
exogenous vulnerability –12.6 –13.9 –10.9 –16.2 –7.4 –14.3 –9.3 
Selection correction, 
exogenous vulnerability –12.5 –13.8 –10.9 –16.2 –7.0 –14.2 –9.3 
Selection correction, 
endogenous vulnerability –24.2 –37.3 –15.5 –33.5 –24.8 –23.0 –22.5 
Number of observations 825 452 509 950 302 409 336
Average intensity 1.035 0.858 0.967 1.024 1.199 1.325 1.077
Informal sector
No selection correction, 
exogenous vulnerability –2.8 –1.3 –0.6 0.2 –0.1 –1.0 –1.7 
Selection correction, 
exogenous vulnerability –2.9 –1.3 –0.7 0.2 –0.3 –1.0 –1.6 
Selection correction, 
endogenous vulnerability –19.9 –17.2 –3.4 1.0 –13.1 –9.7 –15.6 
Number of observations 2,842 2,906 3,236 3,492 2,857 2,230 2,745
Average intensity 1.661 1.801 1.757 1.959 1.960 2.229 1.787
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 4.1 for details).
Note: The marginal effect at the average point of intensity (denoted I
–
) was calculated using the following equation: 
log( ) . . exp ( . . ) ( ) ( ) ( ) expy a I b I y a I b I em I
y
I
I â I= + ⇒ = + ⇒ =
∂
∂ = +
22 2 ( . . ).â I I+ 2bb
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of vulnerability alters the magnitude of the marginal eff ects. Th e marginal eff ect 
of vulnerability on earnings is already markedly negative before correcting for 
endogeneity. Aft er endogeneity is taken into account, the impact remains nega-
tive and increases.
In the formal private sector, one additional point of vulnerability reduces 
income by 16–34 percent. Th e eff ect is smaller in the informal sector; if the 
endogeneity of vulnerability had not been taken into account, the eff ect would 
have been negligible. Once the endogeneity of vulnerability is included, vulner-
ability has a large impact on earnings, with one additional point of vulnerability 
reducing income by 3–20 percent. Th e marginal eff ect is positive only in Dakar. 
Th ese marginal eff ects are calculated for average vulnerability intensity. In 
the formal private sector, workers satisfy one in eight vulnerability criteria on 
average. In the informal sector, the average vulnerability point is close to 2. 
Hence, if we want to identify any compensating eff ects for higher than average 
vulnerability levels, we have to study the coeffi  cients estimated for the second-
degree vulnerability intensity polynomial.
Regression results (not shown here but refl ected in fi gure 4.1) show that, 
regardless of the model used, vulnerability has a negative eff ect on earnings 
in all cities except Dakar and in both institutional sectors. However, the eff ect 
of vulnerability is nonlinear and convex, as the coeffi  cient of I2 is positive and 
signifi cant. Th is quadratic eff ect is signifi cant at the 5 percent level, at least, and 
mostly at the 1 percent level in all cities and sectors except the formal private 
sector in Bamako, where vulnerability squared has no signifi cant impact on 
earnings.
Th e convexity observed in the descriptive analysis holds in the formal and 
informal private sectors once individual characteristics, selection, and endoge-
neity are controlled for. It can be seen in fi gure 4.2, which shows the average 
income predicted by the Lee model with endogeneization of vulnerability by 
vulnerability level (the curves produced by the ordinary least squares model 
and the simple Lee model are similar).
In the formal private sector, earnings are convex in vulnerability intensity 
in all cities, albeit in a markedly decreasing manner. Th e curve is convex, but 
the slope does not change sign for low levels of vulnerability. A change of sign 
appears only at vulnerability levels that are not well represented in terms of the 
number of workers (four or more). In other words, income losses associated 
with vulnerability are lower for high levels of vulnerability but do not translate 
into gains. In Cotonou, however, the level of gains for a vulnerability level of 4 
is similar to the level of gains obtained for zero vulnerability.
In the informal sector, convexity is observed in all cities, with the slope of 
the earnings curves rising above a vulnerability level of 2. In all cities, average 
predicted earnings for a vulnerability level of 4 or 5 are higher than average pre-
dicted earnings for a vulnerability level of 2. In Cotonou, the average predicted 
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Figure 4.1 Marginal Effect of Vulnerability on Earnings in Seven Cities in West Africa, 
by Income Decile
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Figure 4.2 Average Predicted Earnings by Vulnerability Intensity in Seven Cities in West Africa
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earnings for a vulnerability level of 5 is even higher than the average predicted 
earnings for workers who are not vulnerable at all.
Th e assumption that earnings can compensate for a certain level of vulner-
ability therefore holds in the informal sector. More-vulnerable workers are 
better paid. In keeping with the theory of compensating wage diff erentials, 
this fi nding can be explained by the fact that employers off er higher earn-
ings to fi nd employees prepared to work in vulnerable jobs. For independent 
workers, vulnerability can be a way of earning more immediate gains from 
their work. 
In the informal sector, the marginal eff ect at average vulnerability is negative 
in all cities except Dakar, where it is slightly positive. Th e average vulnerability 
level (about 2) is close to the minima of the convex curves. At these average 
points, income is a decreasing function of vulnerability. Above these points, 
earnings are an increasing function of vulnerability. A signifi cant proportion of 
workers are above the average vulnerability level. Depending on the city, 27–62 
percent of workers in the formal private sector and 38–65 percent of workers in 
the informal sector are more vulnerable than average.
Employers do not compensate workers for the average level of vulnerability; 
it is simply a feature of the job market in a particular city. Workers can negoti-
ate wage compensation for higher levels of vulnerability. If dependent workers 
believe that they are more vulnerable than average, they may be in a position to 
negotiate premium pay. If the market imposes a certain level of vulnerability on 
independent workers, they will be inclined to make their job a bit more vulner-
able to earn a higher income. 
Distributional Approach
Th e distributional approach involves estimating model 4.5 for a certain number 
of earnings quantiles. For simplicity of presentation, we report only the series 
of marginal eff ects of vulnerability, calculated by deciles (fi gure 4.1). Th e curves 
presented are the third-degree trend curves, which are more fl exible than the 
quadratic function. Th e marginal eff ects are calculated using the coeffi  cients 
resulting from the quantile regressions, taking into account the endogeneity 
of vulnerability. In all cities, the marginal eff ect of vulnerability on earnings at 
the average vulnerability point varies depending on its position in the earnings 
distribution.
In the formal private sector, the marginal eff ect of average vulnerability 
is negative across the entire distribution, meaning there is no compensating 
mechanism in the formal private sector at the average point. Th e cities of Coto-
nou, Dakar, Lomé, Niamey, and Ouagadougou present the same concave and 
then convex marginal eff ect curves; the points of infl ection are close to median 
earnings in the distributions. Th e curve in Bamako diff ers. It is solely concave, 
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reaches its maximum at the median earnings. One additional point of vulner-
ability is associated with a 10 percent decrease in the earnings of an individual 
with average vulnerability in the fi ft h decile of the distribution. Abidjan’s curve 
is slightly convex at the lower tail of the distribution and then concave. Th e 
marginal eff ect of vulnerability on earnings varies little along the distribution 
(20–30 percent income loss).
In the informal sectors of Bamako, Cotonou, and Dakar the marginal eff ect 
of vulnerability along the conditional distribution of earnings is rising and 
mainly concave. It becomes positive as of the third decile in Dakar and as of 
the sixth decile in Bamako and Cotonou. Hence, for Dakar workers in the 
seventh decile with an average level of vulnerability, a one-point increase in 
vulnerability is associated with average increased earnings of 25 percent. In 
Cotonou, a one-point increase in the vulnerability of workers in the ninth 
decile with average vulnerability is associated with an average increase in earn-
ings of 15–20 percent. In Bamako the eff ect is lower, but not negligible, as 
the increase in earnings can be as high as 5 percent for workers in the eighth 
decile. In the other cities (Abidjan, Lomé, Niamey, and Ouagadougou), one 
additional point of vulnerability is associated with no increase in earnings 
compared with average vulnerability, regardless of the position in the distribu-
tion. In Niamey, however, the income losses caused by a one-point increase in 
vulnerability are smaller for the eighth and ninth deciles.
In Dakar, Cotonou, and Bamako, the marginal eff ect of average vulnerabil-
ity is positive for higher deciles of the earnings distribution. Dakar, Cotonou, 
and—to a lesser extent—Bamako display both the highest compensation for 
vulnerability and positive eff ects of vulnerability on high earnings for average 
levels of vulnerability. In the informal sectors of these cities, vulnerability has a 
diff erent eff ect on earnings depending on the worker’s relative position on the 
remuneration scale. For similar observable characteristics, workers at the lower 
tail of the earnings distribution (poor) are penalized in monetary terms for 
their vulnerability whereas workers at the upper tail of the distribution receive 
compensation for their vulnerability. Th is diff erence can be explained by greater 
bargaining power among workers at the upper tail of the earnings distribution. 
Dependent workers with higher skills may be in a better position to negotiate 
their wages. Among independent workers (the majority in the informal sector), 
the poorest cannot raise their income to compensate for the vulnerability of 
their work (by increasing the prices of goods or services they sell, for example). 
In contrast, independent workers at the upper tail of the earnings distribution 
can more easily make trade-off s between working conditions and earnings by 
keeping prices high. Furthermore, labor supply may well outstrip demand in 
low-income activity sectors. In this case, employers would not have to fi nan-
cially compensate workers for adverse working conditions, and own-account 
workers would not be able to raise their mark-up. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, we develop indicators of employment vulnerability in seven West 
African economic capitals and study their links with individual earnings from 
the main job. According to the theory of compensating diff erentials, workers 
receive pecuniary compensation commensurate with the strenuous or hazardous 
nature of their tasks or the adverse nature of their working conditions. Th is chap-
ter draws on this theory, applying it to working conditions and more broadly to 
vulnerability in employment (contractual insecurity, working conditions, under-
employment, and stopgap jobs mismatched with individual characteristics), a 
dominant characteristic of urban labor markets in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Indicators of employment vulnerability in seven West African cities  (Abidjan, 
Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lomé, Niamey, and Ouagadougou) reveal that in the 
private sector, 83 percent of dependent workers and 86 percent of independent 
workers are vulnerable. Th ese percentages mask huge diff erences between the 
formal private and informal sectors, where 98 percent of dependent and 87 
percent of independent workers are vulnerable. Among workers in the private 
sector, 85 percent meet at least one criterion for vulnerability. 
Th e quantitative analysis fi nds that the impact of vulnerability on earnings is 
negative for an average level of vulnerability (except in Dakar, where it is slightly 
positive). In the formal private sector, income losses associated with vulnerabil-
ity are lower for high levels of vulnerability. In Cotonou, for example, the level 
of earnings for average vulnerability is close to the level of earnings obtained 
for zero vulnerability. In the informal sector, however, the average predicted 
earnings for workers with high vulnerability scores are higher than the aver-
age predicted earnings for workers with relatively low vulnerability scores. In 
Cotonou, the average predicted earnings for level 5 vulnerability (on a scale of 
1–8) is even higher than the average predicted earnings for workers who are not 
vulnerable. Th e assumption that average earnings may compensate for a certain 
level of vulnerability is thus confi rmed in the informal sector. Th is compensa-
tion or lesser-loss mechanism for high levels of vulnerability aff ects a signifi cant 
share of workers. Average vulnerability is not compensated for; it is an inherent 
characteristic of the job markets in these cities.
Th e marginal eff ect is estimated through regressions on the earnings average, 
which conceal variations in the magnitude of the impact of vulnerability along 
the earnings distribution. Quantile regressions fi nd evidence that the impact of 
vulnerability on earnings is not uniform, particularly in the informal sector. For 
example, in the informal sectors of Dakar, Cotonou, and Bamako, the marginal 
eff ect of average vulnerability is positive for the upper deciles of the earnings 
distribution. Dakar, Cotonou, and, to a lesser extent, Bamako display both the 
highest compensation for high levels of vulnerability and the positive eff ects of 
average vulnerability on earnings among the highest earnings.
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For average levels of vulnerability, compensating wage diff erentials are 
found at the upper tail of the distribution. However, the compensating mecha-
nism does not concern the poorest workers. Although the poorest dependent 
workers should be the most forceful in wage bargaining in an endeavor to earn 
a living wage, they have less bargaining power because of the urgent nature of 
their needs. Urban labor market imbalances could also explain this absence 
of compensating wage diff erentials at the lower tail of the distribution, where 
labor supply probably far exceeds demand. Similarly, the poorest indepen-
dent workers suff er more from their vulnerability and do not adopt strategies 
to compensate for it by increasing their profi ts (raising receipts or reducing 
expenditure). An independent worker at the upper tail of the earnings dis-
tribution could more easily make trade-off s between working conditions and 
earnings.
Notes
 1. Th e still-developing economic literature on vulnerability includes a range of defi ni-
tions. Wilson and Ramphele (1989) defi ne vulnerability as the risk of destitution, 
famine, or death. Th e concept of vulnerability moved forward with Sen’s capabil-
ity approach (1992, 1999). Cheli and Lemmi (1995) refer subsequently to exposure 
to the risk of poverty. Qizilbash (2003, 2006) views vulnerability as an individual’s 
distance from an unambiguous state of poverty. Dubois and Rousseau (2001) view 
vulnerability in terms of the structure of “capabilities” that enables individuals to 
replace (or not) one capability with another in the event of an exogenous shock. Th e 
loss of a job would therefore have a greater impact on an individual with less leeway 
to work in diff erent occupations and a low level of economic and social capital. Th e 
notion of vulnerability adopted in this chapter is similar to that developed by Cheli 
and Lemmi (1995) and Qizilbash (2006), as it remains vague about the exact level of 
the state of poverty and its multidimensional aspect. 
 2. Health hazards are not considered, because the data used did not include them. 
 3. However, there is not a great deal of empirical evidence to support this point. See in 
particular Poggi (2007) and Fernández and Nordman (2009).
 4. In the more developed version of this chapter (Bocquier, Nordman, and Vescovo 
2010), we used a qualitative approach, conducting a principal component factor 
analysis on the diff erent aspects of vulnerability. Th e main components were then 
used as vulnerability variables. We thus relaxed the assumption that all the criteria 
involved in vulnerability have the same weight. Technical details on our econometric 
procedure, additional tables, and results are also reported in this version. 
 5. Although Abidjan and Cotonou are not administrative capitals, we refer to them as 
capitals because they are the most important economic centers in their countries 
(Cotonou is also the seat of government).
 6. See Katz (1986) for a review of effi  ciency wage theories, Lindbeck and Snower 
(1989) for a review of insider-outsider models (labor market segmentation the-
ory), and Akerlof and Yellen (1990) for an extended version of effi  ciency wage 
theory.
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 7. Th e studies on this issue reach confl icting conclusions. See, for example, French and 
Dunlap (1998); Groot and Maassen van den Brink (1998); Lanfranchi, Ohlsson, and 
Skalli (2002); Magnani (2002); Clark and Senik (2006); Bockerman and Ilmakunnas 
(2006); and Poggi (2007).
 8. Not all second-job holders are vulnerable. Public and private sector wage-earners 
sometimes work second jobs to earn money for retirement or for their children.
 9. Th e status hierarchy is as follows: senior executives, engineers, or equivalent; mid-
dle managers and supervisors and skilled and semi-skilled nonmanual and manual 
employees; unskilled workers; apprentices and family workers.
 10. See Bocquier, Nordman, and Vescovo (2010) for further discussion of our identifi ca-
tion strategies.
 11. Detailed regression tables are available from the authors.
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